In issue 92 of “die Datenschleuder”, the official magazine of Chaos Computer Club (CCC), on a plastic foil, you may find the fingerprint of German interior minister Wolfgang Schlauble. According to CCC, applying the foil on the biometrics reader to be used for German passport may impersonate the minister. CCC could not test it. Nevertheless, the hackers claim that they experimented with them.
One of the challenges of biometrics is to verify that the measured biometrics are from a living principal. For instance, new generation of fingerprint measures temperature of the finger, blood pressure, or resistivity of the skin. This may allow to detect fake fingers. Of course, another potential weakness is impersonation after the physical capture. In this case, all the additional measurements are useless.
This story, regardless of its potential veracity, highlights the inherent limitations of biometrics. It is possible to revoke a compromised key. It is impossible to revoke a compromised biometrics identity. If your fingerprint is available for a given technology, there is noway to stop it.
If this risk of capturing biometrics is real, then biometrics should be used only on two-factor authentication. In this configuration, the compromise of biometrics identity can be partly compensated by the second factor. In fact, in this case, the authentication is reduced (for the compromised identities) to a one-factor authentication. This is better than nothing. An upgrade of the biometrics method that would cope with the attacks would allow to re-validate the value of the biometrics.
In any case, generalization of biometrics will open a new black market: forged biometrics identity.
PS: “Die Datenschleuder” could be translated as “the data sling”.