Wii’s afficionados have now their homebrew channel

Homebrew applications are applications, often games, developed by hobbyists to run on game platforms (or mobile phones). Wii had already some homebrew applications using a hack so called Twilight hack. Now, it is even more convenient. There is an application that can be loaded as a Wii channel. In other words, through the Homebrew channel, user can play games (or other applications) that were developed and distributed without the authorization of Nintendo. The games can be loaded through SD cards, and even remotely through TCP!

They are extremely well organized with even a Wiki at Wiibrew.org

Ransomware virus (3)

Kapersky labs has given up their unrealistic tentative to guess the key used by Gpcode (see blog entry from 10th June). Their conclusion is that the best countermeasure is regular backup.

Nevertheless, thanks to a “common” mistake of the virus’s author, there may be some hope for careless users who did not backup. When encrypting the file, the virus creates a new files that it renames with the expected extension and then deletes the original file. The deletion is not secure. It is common knowledge (at least in the security community) that a simple deletion does not erase the file. It mainly erases the fields in the file system’s indexing tables. Thus, if the data are on the hard disk as long as they are not be overwritten by a new file. If there was not too much activity on the hard drive, typical recovery tools may retrieve the “deleted” files. Kapersky Labs proposes such a tool from the open source community.

No doubt that the author of the virus will add a secure deletion in the new already announced releases of Gpcode. The author claims that he will use stronger algorithm and new keys. Secure deletion is performed by overwriting every bytes of the file to delete with random data several times before removing it. Tools exist that perform such secure erasing

Two lessons:

  • Backup, backup, and backup
  • Developers if you want to delete a file, use a secure procedure.

 

New strategy for RIAA?

According to Ars Technica, it seems that RIAA has decided to strike back the current tactic to quash their subpoenas. Many students try to thwart the threat of RIAA’s pre-litigation letter by an escalating strategy of successive motion filings.

The tactic is simple: escalate the fees. RIAA proposes to settle the case for $3,000 after reception of the pre-litigation letter. This settlement fee jumps at $4,000 in case of going in front of the court. If the subpoena is challenged, then the fees rockets at $8,000.

Will this new tactic:
1- reduce the number of challenged subpoenas? Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) already challenges this new technique.
2- significantly reduce the amount of downloaded songs through P2P?

In addition to this US strategy, we see more and more legal offers of DRM-free downloads. This is probably the best strategy (If we believe that honest people stay honest.

FBI warning against counterfeited CISCO routers

Beginning May, FBI issued a warning about counterfeited CISCO routers. The US government, university, and companies were purchasing top notch routers from CISCO. In fact, their retailers were sourcing in China with counterfeited material. Thus, more than 3,500 gears were installed in critical places with counterfeited materials.

The problem is that nobody knows if there was no trapdoor installed in these routers. Backdoor in sensitive places would be very strong weapons for any attacker. Currently, we don’t know if is a part of warfare or just a traditional counterfeiting operation.

In order to limit the expenses, more and more governments and even armies use main street devices for their infrastructure. They do not anymore build their equipment. This means that they change their trust model. They are using the same trust assumption as we, common mortals, use: trust your supplier.

Of course in case of counterfeited material, this assumption is extremely weak. The risk is not only the presence of trapdoors, but simply the quality of the device or software itself. On critical equipment, the reliability may be lower than expected.

Nevertheless, is this assumption true for genuine equipment? This reminds me the accusation of NSA trapdoor in Microsoft cryptographic API. Researcher discovered the presence of key called NSA_key! (see cryptome.org). This ended up with some governments requiring to use exclusively Open Source in some parts of their IT infrastructure to avoid potential trapdoors.

To view the presentation of FBI, visit abovetopsecret.com

Ransoming virus (2)

The story continues.

Dving a little bit more in the available information. Gpcode is actually using RSA 1024. Kapersky labs have extracted the public keys. The virus uses two public keys depending on the version of the Operating System. The virus calls Microsoft cryptographic library.

Having the public key is useless. Kapersky labs is calling for the help of crypto community to help to crack the private key. In other words, they launch their own RSA-1024 challenge (See RSA number challenges that apply only to factorization). This is illusory. It would require too much power calculation (else it would have been decided that RSA 1024 is not anymore safe). And there are two keys to crack!!!

The only effective countermeasure against Gpcode is backup your data.

Thanks Alain for the link to the blog  :Wink:

Ransoming virus

Kapersky lab, the anti-virus editor, detected a variant of virus Gpcode. It encrypts some data files on the hard disk, renames them with extension ._CRYPT, and adds a file !_README_!.txt in the folder. Then, it displays a message announcing the encryption and giving a contact mail.

The virus claims to use RSA-1024. Thus, out of the possibility of brute force attack. Pirated person should contact the pirate, pay the ransom, and he will receive a decryption tool.

This type of attack is not new. Older virus used the same technique. More dangerously, attackers penetrated enterprise network and encrypted critical data. Later asking the ransom. This type of attack is not well advertised because enterprise look for discretion (bad reputation).

Should the victim of the virus pay?

  • First of all, normally if the data are carefully daily back-up, then this attack is just painful but not lethal. Would the attack notification appear several days or weeks after infection, it may be more problematic. There are many files that you do not access daily. Some people, or SOHO do their backup on rewritable storage overwriting previous backup.
  • What does guarantee that after payment, the pirate will provide the decryption tool? Would you trust your tormentor?

By teh way, does the virus really use RSA 1024? May be it just brags it and implements a lesser secure one. The advantage of using asymmetric crypto is that reverse engineering the virus will not leak the key (that may not be the case with symmetric crypto). It would be “funny” if the virus would just use a XOR with a long key, or even put random data (if the pirate does expect to extort money)

Lessons from Société Générale

In January 2008, the name of Jérome Kerviel became famous. This second-rate French trader generated 5 billions € of losses to his bank, Société Générale. Jeremy Epstein uses this story to illustrate 13 lessons for security. His lessons have many common points with our 10 laws. Some of them are more original. My preferred ones are:
Lesson 1: “Low tech attacks are easier” and according to me often neglected.
Lesson 7: “Don’t believe every thing you read”. This lesson is true even out of the field of security. Trusted information is a difficult quest.
Nonlesson 11: “Insider attacks (usually) have motivation”

It is perhaps in the motivation space that the failure of Société Générale finds its root. The latest report highlights that the controlling mechanism of the traders did not work properly. We may question if it was not on purpose. At end December 2007, Jerome Kerviel generated 1.5 billions € for his bank. For that, he violated many rules. What would be the behavior of a controller who detects such violation which produces such huge benefits? (Being a second rate trader, Kerviel was not authorized for such huge investments). Is it not tempting for the management to close its eyes? This is another illustration of our law 9: Quid custodient ipsos custodies?

The paper is in the latest issue of IEEE security & privacy, may-june 2008. A good reading.

And you, which is your favorite lesson?