We know where you went

Google released a new enhancement to Google Maps.  The timeline provides you the complete history of locations of your Android  mobile device, i.e., likely you.  The history is going deep in the past (2009 if you had an Android phone).   The analysis is detailled with even the shops or places you may have visited.   It is extremely accurate.  It is also linked to Google Photo to display the corresponding pictures you may have shot ta that time.

The timeline is only available to you, or more precisely to the entity that logs into your account.

It is scary.  The positive side is that Google does not hide that it tracks all our movements.

 

The feature is available at https://www.google.com/maps/timeline

 

Update:  The feature can be deactivated under yourf Google account history parameters,  It is not clear ifr you simply deactivate the time line feature or Google erases the history.

RIP SSL

IETF has officially deprecated SSL 3.0 with the publication of  RFC 7568: SSLv3 Is Not Secure. RFC 7568: SSLv3 Is Not Secure. TLS clients and servers MUST NOT send a request for an SSLv3 session. Similarly, TLS clients and servers MUST close any session requesting SSLv3. According to RFC2119, must means mandatory.
POODLE signed the certificate of death.
As a consequence, we should avoid using anymore the vocable SSL when indeed we mean TLS. During a long period, we often merged SSL and TLS when writing. We should discipline ourselves now. Will the community dare remove SSL from OpenSSL or LibreSSL? Will it be rebaptized OpenTLS, or keep SSL name as a tribute?

Stealing account with mobile phone-based two-factor authentication

Attackers often entice users to become the weakest link.   Phishing and scams exploit the human weakness.  These attacks become even creepier if the attacker circumvents legitimate security mechanisms.   Two factor authentication offers better security than simple login/password.  The use of mobile phone as the second factor is becoming mainstream.  It is impossible to steal our account without stealing our phone.  We feel safer.  Should we?

Symantec reported a new used method to steal the account of users despite the use of a two-factor authentication.   Here is the scheme.

Mallory wants to gain access to Alice’s account.  He knows Alice email address and her mobile phone number as well as her account.  For a social engineer, this information is not difficult to collect.  It is part of the usual exploration phase before the actual hack.   Mallory contacts the service provider of Alice’s account and requests a password reset.  He selects the method that sends a digital code to Alice’s mobile phone.   The service provider sends an SMS to Alice’s mobile phone with this code. Simultaneously, Mallory sends an SMS to Alice impersonating the service provider.  Once more, this is not difficult as many providers do not use a specific number.  This SMS explains to Alice that there was some suspicious activity on her account.  To verify her account, she must reply to this SMS with the code that was sent previously to her.  Gullible Alice obeys.  Mallory has now the code that the service provider requests to reset Alice password.  Mallory gains entire access to Alice’s account with the involuntary help of Alice.

This type of attack can be used on most web services, e.g., webmails like gmail.  Obviously, Alice should not have replied to this SMS.  She should have followed the known procedure and not an unknown one.  She may have been cautious that the two phone numbers were different.

This is a perfect example of social engineering.   The only answer is education.  Therefore, spread this information around you,  The more people are aware, the less they will be prone to be hacked.  Never forget Law 6: You are the weakest link.

How people perceive hacking

People make decision following mental models that they have of how a system works.  Security is not different from other fields.  Experts or technically well-informed people may have mental models that are reasonably accurate, i.e. the mental model fits reasonably with the real world behavior.  For normal users, the problem is different.  Wash Rick identified several mental models used by normal users when handling security in a paper entitled “Folk Model of Home Computer Security”. For instance, he extracted four mental models describing what viruses are:

  • Viruses are bad; people using this mental model have little knowledge about virus and thus believed they were not concerned. They thought to be immune.
  • Viruses are buggy software; viruses are normal software that are badly written. Their bugs may crash the computer or create strange behavior.  People understood that they needed to download and install such viruses.  Thus, their protection solution was only to install trusted software.
  • Viruses cause mischief; viruses are pieces of software that are intentionally annoying. They disrupt the normal behavior of the computer.  People do not understand the genesis of virus.  They understand that the infection comes from clicking on applications or visiting bad sites.  Their suggested protection is to be careful.
  • Viruses support crime; the end goal of viruses is identity theft or sifting personal and banking information. As such, people believe that viruses are stealthy and do not impair the behavior of the computer.   Their suggested protection is the regular use of anti-virus software.

Wash extracted four mental models used to understand hackers.

  • Hackers are digital graffiti artists; hackers are skilled individuals that enter in computers just for mischief and show off. They are often young geeks with poor morality.  This is the Hollywood image of hackers.  The victims are random.
  • Hackers are burglars; Hackers act with computers as burglars act with physical properties. The goal is financial gain.  The victims are chosen opportunistically.
  • Hackers are criminals targeting big fish; these hackers are similar to previous ones but their victims are either organizations or rich people.
  • Hackers are contractors who support criminals; these hackers are similar to the graffiti hackers but they are henchmen of criminal organizations. Their victims are mostly large organizations.

When applying these mental models, it is obvious that some best practices will never be used by end users, regardless of their pertinence.  Most of them do not understand these practices or feel they are not concerned by these practices.  For instance, users who believe that virus are bad or buggy software cannot understand the interest to install an anti-virus.  Users assimilating hackers to contractors believe that hackers will never attack their home computers.  Better understanding the mental model of users highlights where awareness is needed to adjust user’s mental model to the reality.  It helps also to design efficient secure solutions that may seem to fit the mental model although they fight in the real model.

Reference:

Wash, Rick. “Folk Models of Home Computer Security.” In Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, 11:1–11:16. SOUPS ’10. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010. .

Smart Bottle

JW_Blue_Smart_Bottle_3Diageo and Thin Films have recently demonstrated a smart bottle.   The seal of the bottle contains a NFC tag.  This tag not only carries unique identity of the bottle, but it detects also whether the seal was opened or is still closed.  This smart tag allows interesting features:

  • As for traditional RFID tags, it enables the follow up of the bottle along the delivery chain.
  • As it uses NFC, the seal allows a mobile phone app to identify the bottle, and thus create a personalized experience (interesting features for privacy: it is possible to track who purchased the bottle (at the point of sale with the credit card) and see who actually drinks it (was it a gift?))
  • As it detects if the seal has been broken, it is a way to detect tampering of the bottle during the distribution chain.  This may thwart some forms of piracy and counterfeiting.
  • The tag is also a way to authenticate the origin of the product.  It may have interesting application for expensive rare bottles to verify counterfeiting.
  • It does not yet tell if you drank too much.  This will be the next application associated to the smart glass that will detect what you drink and how much 

See thinfilm brochure opensense

CANS 2015 submissions

The 14th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2015) will be at Marrakech in December.  The submission deadline is 19 june 2015.  The topics of interest are rather broad:

  • Access Control for Networks
  • Adware, Malware, and Spyware
  • Anonymity & Pseudonymity
  • Authentication, Identification
  • Cloud Security
  • Cryptographic Algorithms & Protocols
  • Denial of Service Protection
  • Embedded System Security
  • Identity & Trust Management
  • Internet Security
  • Key Management
  • Mobile Code Security
  • Multicast Security
  • Network Security
  • Peer-to-Peer Security
  • Security Architectures
  • Security in Social Networks
  • Sensor Network Security
  • Virtual Private Networks
  • Wireless and Mobile Security

The accepted papers will be published in Springer LNCS.  It is an IACR event.

Lenovo, Superfish, Komodia: a Man In The Middle story

Lenovo has made this week the headlines with the alleged malware: superfish.   Lenovo delivered  some PCx loaded with “bloatware” Superfish.  Superfish provides solution that performs visual search.  Seemingly, Superfish designed a software that allowed to place contextual ads on the web browsing experience.   To perform this highjacking, superfish uses a software stack from Komodia:  SSL Digestor.  According to the site of Komodia:

Our advanced SSL hijacker SDK is a brand new technology that allows you to access data that was encrypted using SSL and perform on the fly SSL decryption. The hijacker uses Komodia’s Redirector platform to allow you easy access to the data and the ability to modify, redirect, block, and record the data without triggering the target browser’s certification warning.

How does Komodia do the decryption without triggering the certificate validation of the browser?   The CERT has disclosed on Thursday the trick with its vulnerability note VU#529496.

Komodia Redirector with SSL Digestor installs non-unique root CA certificates and private keys, making systems broadly vulnerable to HTTPS spoofing

Komodia install stealthily its own root certificate within the browsers’ CA repository.   The stack holds its private key. This allows to ‘self-sign’ certificate to forge SSL connection.  The software then generates a typical Man In The Middle.   Despite the private key was encrypted, it was possible to extract some corresponding private keys (easy to guess the password; komodia).  This means that as long as the root key is not erased from browsers’ repository, an attacker may use the corresponding private key.  The attacker may sign malware that would be accepted by the machine, and generate phony certificates for phishing.   In other words, other principals than Superfish may use the hack for infecting Lenovo computers.

Lenovo provided a patch that removed the Superfish application.   Unfortunately, the patch does not erase the malicious certificate.  Microsoft provided such patch, and Mozilla should soon revoke it.

This is a perfect example of supply chain attack. The main difference is that the supplier voluntarily infected its product.    Do never forget law 4: Trust No One.

PS:  at the time of writing, the Komodia site was down, allegedly for a DOS.  It may also be because too many people try to visit the site.